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Introduction
Contemporary scholars of international political economy (IPE)
have increasingly sought to encourage a ‘global conversation’ that
extends beyond debates between the well-known ‘American’ and
‘British’ schools of thought. Greater attention is being devoted to the
contributions of IPE scholars from elsewhere, particularly beyond
Europe and the United States. To date, however, these efforts to
‘globalise’ IPE have focused largely on current scholarship. Efforts
to teach and research the historical foundations of IPE thought in
classical political economy in the 18th, 19th and early 20th centuries
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remain stubbornly centred on European and American thinkers. If a
more extensive ‘global conversation’ is to be fostered, the
perspectives of historical thinkers from other regions need to be
brought more into the mainstream of the field’s intellectual history.
This article explores one way in which IPE scholars can begin to
‘globalise’ the history of the classical foundations of IPE thought.
IPE textbooks usually identify three core traditions of thought in
classical political economy on which current IPE scholarship builds:
economic liberalism, economic nationalism and Marxism. As a first
step towards developing a more global intellectual history of the
classical foundations of IPE, this article demonstrates how thinkers
beyond Europe and the United States engaged with and contributed
to debates associated with those three traditions before 1939. In so
doing, it highlights the fact that global conversations about IPE
issues already took place in this earlier age. Those discussions
frequently involved the export of European and American ideas in
the context of unequal power relations. For various reasons,
however, those ideas appealed to many thinkers in other regions who
adapted and transformed them in important ways that deserve greater
recognition. Core concepts associated with those classical schools
were also not all derived from European and American thought;
some emerged autonomously in other parts of the world, and ideas
flowed from other regions to Europe and the United States as well as
among themselves.
Towards a more global
conversation
This article builds on the debates generated by Benjamin Cohen’s
widely read intellectual history of modern IPE (2008) which
suggested that the field had been increasingly dominated since its
birth in the early 1970s by two schools, one rooted in Britain and the
other in the United States. Cohen’s analysis has provoked
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widespread discussions of, and reflections on, the state of IPE (e.g.
Phillips and Weaver 2011). Although Cohen’s goal of fostering a
greater understanding between the British and American schools has
been widely appreciated, many scholars have criticised the narrow
Anglo-American focus of his history as well as the field more
generally. They have called for more attention to be devoted to
schools of thought in other parts of the world, particularly regions
beyond Europe and the United States, in order to ensure that IPE is
more of a ‘global conversation’ (e.g. Blyth 2009; Leander 2009; Cox
2011; Helleiner 2009; Murphy 2009; Phillips 2005).
In a sequel to the 2008 volume, Cohen (2013) acknowledged the
importance of this criticism, and set out to address it by detailing the
state of current IPE scholarship in other regions of the world. This
task has also been taken up by others, including the contributors to a
recent special issue of Review of IPE who explored contemporary
Chinese IPE scholarship under the theme of ‘IPE in China: the global
conversation’ (Chin, Pearson and Wang 2014). These and other
works have highlighted the distinctiveness of IPE thought in
different parts of the world, and provided support for Blyth’s
assertion (2009: 3) that ‘where you sit determines what you think
about IPE’.
These efforts to encourage a global conversation about IPE are
important, but have been limited by the fact that they focus almost
entirely on contemporary IPE scholarship. As Cohen and others have
noted, modern IPE builds upon on a rich body of classical political
economy scholarship in the 18th, 19th and early 20th centuries that
addressed international and global issues of concern to
contemporary IPE scholars. Teaching and research about these
classical foundations of IPE thought remain, however, focused
primarily on historical thinkers in Europe and the United States who
are seen to have pioneered the perspectives of economic liberalism,
economic nationalism and Marxism.
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For a field that aspires to building a more global conversation, this
narrow geographical focus is problematic. One reason has already
received attention in the recent writings of John Hobson (2013a, b)
who has shown how many of these thinkers were infused with
Eurocentric meta-narratives that assumed Europe to be a standard of
civilisation for the rest of the world (see also Blaney and Inayatullah
2010). For contemporary IPE scholars seeking to globalise their
field, Hobson argues, these aspects of its historical foundations need
to be acknowledged, interrogated and transcended.
Much less attention has been devoted to a second reason why the
heavy historical focus on European and American classical thought
is problematic. That approach overlooks the perspectives on political
economy of historical thinkers in other parts of the world.
Contemporary IPE scholars outside Europe and the United States
cite and draw upon political economy discussions that were active in
their regions during the 18th, 19th and early 20th centuries. But those
discussions, and the thinkers associated with them, receive little
attention in most histories of the classical foundations of IPE
thought. Students are thus presented with an unnecessarily narrow
intellectual history, which inhibits mutual understanding among IPE
scholars in different parts of the world. This neglect also prevents
scholars from recognising earlier ‘global conversations’, which may
interest those involved in current initiatives to globalise the field.
If the perspectives of earlier thinkers in other regions of the world can
be identified in a systemic manner, the history of the classical
foundations of IPE thought could be rewritten with a more global
focus. To date, however, IPE scholars have not taken up this task
with the same energy that their international relations counterparts
have begun to devote to incorporating ‘non-western’ perspectives on
the histories of thought in that field (e.g. Acharya 2011; Shilliam
2010; Vasilaki 2012; Seth 2011). While Hobson and others have
critiqued the eurocentrism of classical thought, IPE scholars have not
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yet made much of an effort to ‘globalise’ the content of the canon
itself.
This important task requires a book-length study. As a first step,
however, this article explores one way in which the history of the
classical foundations of IPE thought could begin to be told from a
more global perspective.1 It examines how thinkers outside Europe
and the United States engaged with and contributed to discussions
associated with the three classical traditions of economic liberalism,
economic nationalism and Marxism. This focus imposes important
limits on the range of ideas being analysed, and is adopted here
simply because of space constraints. Other approaches to building a
more ‘global intellectual history’ of IPE’s classical foundations that
are not constrained in this way also need to be pursued actively.2
Classical economic
liberalism
The emergence of classical economic liberalism is usually closely
associated with the publication and influence of Adam Smith’s The
wealth of nations (1976 [1776]), and its advocacy of freer markets.
Smith did not, however, fully develop the international dimensions
of classical economic liberalism. Although he called attention to the
positive-sum nature of international trade (e.g. Morrison 2012),
Smith also strongly defended among the most notorious of his
country’s trade restrictions at that time, the Navigation Acts, on the
grounds that they contributed to the country’s naval power (e.g. Earle
1953). It fell instead to 19th-century economic liberals to consolidate
the international side of classical economic liberal thought more
thoroughly. Particularly important was David Ricardo (1817
[1948]), who developed the core economic case for free trade among
countries: the theory of comparative advantage. Thinkers such as
Richard Cobden added a more political rationale for free trade that
addressed Smith’s earlier security concerns, arguing that trade
Globalising the classical foundations of IPE
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liberalisation would generate peace by cultivating interdependence,
and undermining the social power of the war-mongering aristocratic
classes (Cain 1979).
IPE scholars often note how the core 19th-century liberal belief that
free trade among countries generated both prosperity and peace
became popular across Europe, encouraging various initiatives to
liberalise trade both at home and abroad. But this thinking was also
influential beyond Europe in the 19th century in ways that deserve
greater recognition by IPE scholars. One such place was the Ottoman
Empire, where growing local support for economic liberalism
helped to provide some of the justification for the 1838
Anglo-Ottoman Commercial Treaty that liberalised trade with
Britain as well as within the Ottoman empire (Özveren 2002: 135).
Interestingly, both Ottoman and British leaders hoped the treaty
would constrain the ambitions of Muhammad Ali, the governor of
Ottoman Egypt, who had actively promoted the growth of local
manufacturing in Egypt with import embargos and state monopolies
(Al-Sayyid Marsot 1984). Cobden himself had been a strong critic of
Ali and his cotton textile factories, arguing during a visit to Cairo in
1836 that Egypt should stick to growing cotton for British industry:
‘All this waste is going on with the best raw cotton, which ought to be
sold with us’ (quoted in Morley 1906: 67). Ali initially refused to
abide by the 1838 treaty, but backed down when faced with the threat
of British intervention, leaving Egypt’s new industries to be
undermined by cheap European imports and by foreign merchants
who bought up local raw materials at more competitive rates
(Al-Sayyid Marsot 1984: 250-2; Özveren 2002: 136). In the
following years, the Egyptian economy increasingly centred on the
export of cotton and other raw materials, a development encouraged
by local elites in Egypt and the Ottoman Empire as a whole who
supported economic liberal ideals. Özveren (2002: 137) notes how
the ‘intellectual hegemony of this liberal perspective lasted right into
the 1870s’ (see also Özveren 2015).
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Economic liberal ideas also found local supporters in Bengal in the
early to mid-19th century, particularly among Calcutta merchants
and land owners who were frustrated by the East India Company’s
monopoly control of trade. Sartori (2008: 90) describes how, in the
1830s, the dominant merchant Dwarkanath Tagore advocated ‘free
trade and the abolition of Company monopoly’, and ‘was sincerely
committed to liberal political economy and a vision of cosmopolitan
empire in which Indians could participate politically and
economically as full subjects of the British Crown, even taking seats
in the British Parliament’. Sartori (2008: 22) also notes how some
liberal reformers ‘struggled polemically against forms of social
conservatism in the name (at least in principle) of the emancipation
of the rational, self-interested individual from the bondage of custom
and discrimination ... this discourse was implicitly grounded in the
ideal of free exchange in civil society propounded by classical
political economy’.
The liberal critique of mercantilist colonial trade restrictions also
resonated in early 19th century Latin America, in those regions still
under Spanish or Portuguese colonial rule. It is noteworthy, for
example, that Adam Smith’s work was first translated into
Portuguese in Brazil in 1811-12 rather than in Portugal itself
(Cardoso 2014: 138). Similarly, a Mexican official financed the first
two editions of the most widely used Spanish-language liberal
political economy textbook in much of the 19th century, one that
denounced mercantilism and advocated Ricardian economics and
free trade. That volume was also disseminated throughout Central
America by one of the leaders of Central American independence,
José Ceclio del Valle (Almenar 2014).
Economic liberalism continued to garner support in Latin America in
the middle decades of the 19th century, particularly among merchant
classes and large landholders producing for export who strongly
Globalising the classical foundations of IPE
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endorsed the region’s role as an agricultural and raw material exporter
to Europe. In an analysis of Colombia from the 1850s to the 1870s,
Cristina Rojas (2002) shows how these elite groups also had broader
reasons for endorsing this international division of labour. Identifying
with Europe culturally, they preferred to import European goods and
clothing rather than wear textiles produced by local artisans who were
mestizos, Indians, blacks and women, and ‘were perceived as
“barbarians” in need of civilisation before they could be incorporated
into the productive world’ (Rojas 2002: 105). She also notes how the
enthusiasm of local elites for free trade often went hand in hand with
their endorsement of the use of coercive labour on haciendas in
semi-slave conditions. Their willingness to back economic liberalism
internationally while rejecting it domestically in this way was justified
once again on the grounds that local labour was not ‘civilised’.
The link between civilisational discourse and liberal political
economy was also prominent in Europe. Andrew Phillips (2011:
12-13) shows how British Victorian liberalism was associated with
‘a hybrid civilising mission – pithily encapsulated in the
contemporary slogan “commerce, Christianity and civilisation” –
that decisively conditioned its engagement with non-European
peoples throughout the 19th century’. He continues: ‘Within the
Asian context, this mission implied for Britain the task of liberating
Asia’s millions from the threefold scourges of monopoly, tyranny
and idolatry via the introduction of the beneficent influences of free
trade, “responsible government” and Protestant Christianity.’
Phillips details how this British ‘civilising mission’ justified the use
of force to impose free trade on reluctant foreign governments such
as China (although Cobden himself criticised the Opium Wars as a
barbaric British act; Phillips 2011).
The idea that the promotion of free trade and civilisation went hand in
hand also encountered many sceptics outside Europe, even among
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those who displayed some sympathy to European ideas more
generally. Watching the activities of European merchants in his
region, the British-trained Sierra Leonean doctor James Africanus
Horton – who had converted to Christianity, embraced Victorian
values, and backed the general British goal of leading Africans into
‘civilised Christian life’ (Horton 1969 [1868]: 177) – was one such
sceptic. In his 1868 analysis of the political economy of British West
Africa, Horton (1969 [1868]: 75) argued that the notion that trade
would bring civilisation was ‘a doctrine that has been disproved in
every part of the world where the merchant’s sole purpose is to
acquire a fortune, and where he is not restrained in his actions by a
civilised Government’.
Some economic liberals in Japan also had mixed feelings about free
trade. Japan was one of the Asian countries whose markets were
liberalised by coercion; in this case, American warships forced the
Tokugawa leadership in 1853-4 to abandon their policy – in place
since the 1640s – of tightly controlling external trade. A group of
Japanese thinkers who studied in Europe and America in the 1860s
quickly endorsed the liberal economic ideas they had learnt abroad,
seeing them as universal principles that Japan needed to accept as
part of its wider embrace of ‘civilisation and enlightenment’
(Morris-Suzuki 1989: 49, 53-55; Mizuta 1988). But their support for
the dismantling of domestic feudal barriers to commerce was much
stronger than their backing of free trade between Japan and other
countries. For example, the most prominent Japanese populariser of
Adam Smith’s ideas, Yukichi Fukuzawa, worried that foreigners
might use free trade to leave Japan poor and dependent as a producer
of just primary products. In his view, Japanese merchants had a
‘public duty’ to be ‘fighting the war of trade against foreign
countries’, in which he thought they might need the active support of
the Japanese government (quoted in Sugiyama 1988: 49).
Globalising the classical foundations of IPE
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Classical economic
nationalism
This latter view was in fact widespread among the Japanese officials
who came to power after the 1868 Meiji Restoration. They were
determined to avoid the fate of China by strengthening their country,
particularly by means of industrialisation. Because of the unequal
trade treaties imposed by foreign governments, tariffs could not be
used to protect local manufacturing firms against external
competition. The Meiji leaders turned instead to supporting
industrial growth through mechanisms such as subsidies,
government contracts, state-owned firms, the acquisition of foreign
skills and technology, and the strengthening of national
infrastructure. The results were impressive: Japan’s industrialisation
accelerated rapidly, and its status as a rising international power was
soon confirmed by its defeat of China in 1895 and of Russia in 1905.
The Meiji government is often seen to have followed the advice of
European and American economic nationalists such as Friedrich
List, Alexander Hamilton and Henry Carey. These critics of
economic liberalism saw free trade as a weapon used by Britain to
subordinate other countries. From their standpoint, free trade locked
the rest of the world into agricultural production, while Britain
increasingly monopolised manufacturing activities that were key to
military success and economic growth. These economic nationalists
urged countries to protect and foster local industries in order to
cultivate what List called their ‘productive powers’, just as Britain
itself had done earlier in its rise to power. Underlying these
arguments was an emphasis on the importance of the nation and what
List (1904 [1841]: 97) called ‘its prosperity, civilisation and power’,
as well as a concomitant critique of the cosmopolitanism and
materialism of economic liberalism.3
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These arguments built upon the ideas of earlier European thinkers
who are sometimes described as ‘mercantilists’. The idea that there
was a coherent body of thought that should be labelled
‘mercantilism’ is controversial, but the term is often associated with
17th and 18th-century European thinkers who prioritised the
generation of trade surpluses via activist state policies such as export
subsidies, restrictions on imported manufactured goods, and
preferential shipping rules. Some of these thinkers favoured trade
surpluses because of bullionist views that wealth derived from
precious metals such as gold and silver. But the core goal of most of
those thinkers was to maximise the power of their states within the
competitive and conflictual European state system by fostering
strategic industries, and accumulating bullion to pay mercenaries
and acquire military supplies (Reinert 2011).
It is certainly true that the ideas of European and American economic
nationalists were reflected in the writings of key Meiji officials
involved in formulating Japanese economic policy, such as Ôkubo
Toshimichi and Maeda Masana, both of whom had travelled abroad
(e.g. Sagers 2006: 99). But many of the Meiji initiatives went far
beyond the proposals outlined by European and American thinkers.
Moreover, the ideas of those and other Meiji officials were initially
shaped less by List, Hamilton and Carey than by a set of local ideas
known as ‘kokueki thought’ that had emerged in the distinctive
political environment of Tokugawa Japan (Roberts 1998: 24;
Metzler 2006, Sagers 2006).
During the Tokugawa era, Japan’s educated elite was influenced by
Confucian thought that had traditionally seen commerce and
merchants in a quite negative light. But the promotion of commerce
began to be viewed more positively because of growing competition
for prestige and wealth among the enormous number of localised
political entities that co-existed in Tokugawa Japan, each with its
own judicial, taxation, money-issuing and military powers (Sagers
Globalising the classical foundations of IPE
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2006: 137). In the context of this competitive ‘small interstate
system’ (Metzler 2006: 108), some Japanese thinkers began to urge
local authorities (the daimyos) to support the ‘prosperity of the
country’ – or kokueki – as part of their Confucian obligation to ‘order
the realm and save the people’ (Roberts 1998). Flourishing in the
latter half of the Tokugawa period, advocates of this new kokueki
thought encouraged daimyos to minimise their territory’s ‘imports’
from the rest of Japan with trade restrictions, and to promote
‘exports’ to the wider Japanese market by supporting the production
of specialised (especially manufactured) goods through policies
such as targeted subsidies, monopoly production, and the
recruitment of skilled tradespeople. Commerce was increasingly
seen as a zero-sum, war-like activity intended to maximise local
competitiveness and the accumulation of precious metals.
Many of those involved in Japanese economic policy-making during
the early Meiji period came from regions such as Satsuma, where
kokueki thought had been very influential. After the Meiji
restoration, they simply shifted their focus from the task of
maximising the power and wealth of their local region to that of the
Japanese nation as a whole. Indeed, some kokueki thinkers had
advocated this shift even before the opening of Japan (Sagers 2006:
28-9). It was not until the 1880s that the ideas of western economic
nationalists became very influential in Japan; the works of Carey and
List were not even translated into Japanese until 1884-5 and 1889
respectively (Mizuta 1988; Metzler 2006: 114-5; Morris-Suzuki
1989: 60-1). As Sagers (2006: 108) puts it in the case of Ôkubo, the
ideas of those western thinkers were simply drawn upon ‘to validate
and refine strategic economic policies that had evolved in Satsuma
and other domains’.
While Japanese economic nationalism had these local roots, a
number of the Japanese thinkers who developed kokueki thought
were involved in ‘Dutch learning’ through which they had access to
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foreign writings (via an isolated and tightly controlled Dutch enclave
in Nagasaki which the Tokugawa leadership allowed to exist). Some,
such as Honda Toshiaki, supported their views with explicit
references to European ‘mercantilist’ writing, while others, such as
Takano Chôei, invoked the experience of Holland and England in
promoting commerce, noting that ‘through trade they became rich
and powerful countries’ (quoted in Sagers 2006: 66; see also 28-9).
But kokueki thought also grew out of, and responded directly to, the
distinctive environment of Tokugawa Japan, and its content was not
simply derived from European thought.
A similar point can be made about the impetus behind the
pro-manufacturing policies put in place by Muhammad Ali in early
19th-century Ottoman Egypt, as discussed previously. Afaf Lutfi
Al-Sayyid Marsot (1984: 97) notes that these policies reflected Ali’s
strong ‘mercantilist’ world view that trade was a zero-sum game, and
that domestic industrialisation was crucial for building and
protecting his power. As he once told a French visitor, the factories
he was promoting in Egypt ‘liberate me today from the tribute which
European industry used to levy on Egypt, and the sums with which I
paid for your cloth and silks now remain in the country’ (quoted in
Al-Sayyid Marsot 1984: 178). When defending his policies to British
officials (who were often very critical of his economic activism), Ali
sometimes suggested that he was simply copying earlier British and
French practices (Al-Sayyid Marsot 1984: 172, 174-5). But
Al-Sayyid Marsot’s detailed analysis gives the impression that Ali’s
world view was shaped largely by his own pragmatic experiences as
a merchant and soldier, and by his drive to accumulate power in the
context of various challenges to his rule.4 As Al-Sayyid Marsot
(1984: 97) puts it in describing the economic beliefs of Ali and his top
officials, ‘it was not that the wali and his men were self-consciously
mercantilist, for, after all, the term was probably unknown to them,
but they espoused economic policies which faithfully followed
mercantilist principles’.
Globalising the classical foundations of IPE
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The same appears to have been true of the ‘mercantilist’ thinking of
the Asante leadership in 19th-century West Africa. Between the late
1830s and early 1880s, Asante authorities tightened their control
over all trade in their territory through a body called the Company of
State Traders that was headed by the Asante leader. Wilks (1975:
691) describes this as the ‘great age of mercantilism’, in which a
large share of the economic activity in Asante territory ‘was derived
from the operations of the Company’. After Mensa Bonsu came to
power in 1874, initiatives to fend off British power through political
and economic reforms intensified, and Wilks (1975: 720) notes that
‘mercantilism and neo-mercantilism became the dominant
ideologies within the Asante establishment’. Wilks does not discuss
devote much analysis to the source of these ideologies, but they
appear to have emerged as a pragmatic response to external
challenges facing the Asante. In contrast to late 19th-century Japan,
however, the influence of those ideas was short-lived. Growing
opposition from merchants and the lower classes culminated in a
coup in 1883, followed by political instability, and annexation in
1896 by the British.
In other regions such as Latin America, the influence of European
and North American economic nationalist thought was much clearer
during the 19th century. For example, Brazilian industrialists and
politicians such as Amaro Cavalcanti and Serzedelo Correia invoked
the ideas of List and Carey when calling for tariff protection and
greater state support for industrialisation in the late 19th and early
20th centuries (Boianovsky 2012: 666-7). In Argentina, supporters
of economic liberalism also encountered growing criticism at this
time from List-inspired economic nationalists who argued that free
trade did not support ‘national solidarity’ and was ‘lacking in the
very concept of nationality’ (quoted in Bryan 2010: 64). These critics
included prominent politicians such as Carlos Pellegrini, who
backed greater state support for industrialisation in the form of trade
protectionism and government monopolies (Boianovsky 2012).
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Even Pellegrini’s central role in crafting Argentina’s adoption of the
gold standard in 1899 was driven by his economic nationalist
thinking. This monetary reform – supported in many other countries
by economic liberals – was designed to protect local industry against
currency appreciation at the time (Bryan 2010).
Ironically, Latin American references to List’s ideas declined in the
1930s just at the time that the region’s import-substitution
industrialisation (ISI) began to accelerate. Boiasnky (2012)
attributes this phenomenon to the fact that protectionists began to cite
instead the ideas of the Romanian economist Mihail Manoilescu,
who offered a more sophisticated economic analysis of the benefits
of tariffs. In Brazil, for example, Manoilescu’s 1929 book was
quickly translated into Portuguese, and published with the support of
leading industrialists (Boainsky 2012). Manoilescu’s ideas may also
have appealed to some because he combined his detailed economic
analysis with a broader political discourse about the struggle
between ‘proletarian’ and ‘plutocratic’ nations, and the need for a
kind of ‘socialism among nations’ (quoted in Love 1996: 84).
Colonial India is another place where European and American
economic nationalist thought began to attract more attention in the
last third of the 19th century. By this time, the Calcutta business
leaders who had trumpeted economic liberalism in the 1830s and
1840s had lost influence to European commercial interests. The
latter had seized the commanding heights of the local economy and
were ‘overwhelmingly hostile to the participation of native capital
and to the employment even of British-trained Indians’ (Sartori
2008: 96). Colonial India had become primarily an exporter of
primary products and a captive market for British industrial exports
that severely undermined local manufacturers, particularly after the
1879 repeal of import duties. This economic transformation
encouraged growing Indian nationalist criticism of colonial
Globalising the classical foundations of IPE
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economic policy, and widespread demands for the protection of local
industry.
Many of the leading critics were closely linked to the Indian National
Congress, and included Dadabhai Naoriji, who developed an
innovative analysis of how colonial rule was draining enormous
wealth from India to Britain. To support this ‘drain theory’, Naoriji
pointed to many features of the colonial economy ranging from
payments for imports of British products to the interest charges on
the colonial government’s external debt. His critique of colonial rule
became well known among European Marxist theorists of
imperialism such as Karl Kautsky, with whom he had an extended
correspondence (Goswami 2004: 226). Goswami (2004: 11) also
notes how it ‘anticipated twentieth-century dependency frameworks
forged by Latin American intellectuals’.
Another well-known Indian economic nationalist associated with
the Congress was Mahadev Govind Ranade. Influenced by List and
other foreign economic nationalists, Ranade critiqued economic
liberals for failing to recognise the distinctiveness of Indian
conditions and the importance of nationalist economic, political and
cultural goals (Goswami 2004). He argued that free trade policies
imposed by Britain had deindustrialised the Indian economy and
transformed it into a ‘[p]lantation, growing raw produce to be
shipped by British Agents in British ships, to be worked into Fabrics
by British skill and capital, and to be re-exported to the Dependency
by British merchants to their corresponding British firms in India and
elsewhere’ (quoted in Goswami 2004). Ranade wanted to see tariff
protection and government support for Indian industry, but he also
recognised that India’s colonial status constrained the possibilities
for the kind of economic nationalism that List and others advocated:
‘It is not open to us to adopt certain plans of operation, which,
however much they might be condemned on abstract grounds, have
been followed with practical success in many of the most enlightened
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countries of Europe and America’ (quoted in Gopalakrishnan 1959:
106)
Given that the colonial government would not protect and support
local industry, Indian economic nationalists were forced to innovate.
Particularly important in the early 20th century was the emergence of
the consumption-based swadeshi movement that urged Indians to
boycott foreign goods and purchase only items made by local
producers. Goswami (2004: 283, 243) notes that this movement
sought to support national economic development ‘on the terrain of
everyday practices’, and ‘fused together the abstract and
universalistic notion of a common economic collective with a
particularised idealist vision of the social body as specifically
Hindu’. Regarding the latter, swadeshi thought critiqued the
materialism of western civilisation and liberal economic theory on
cultural grounds, arguing – in Sartori’s words (2008: 156) – that ‘the
Indian national self recognised that the pursuit of worldly interests,
be they political or economic, had meaning only insofar as these ends
were subordinated to the higher ends of spirit’.
Provoked by the British partition of Bengal in 1905, the Indian
National Congress officially endorsed the swadeshi movement in
1906, and it marked ‘the first systematic campaign to incorporate and
mobilise the “masses” within the elite structure of institutional or
Congress nationalism’ (Goswami 2004: 12). Another source of
inspiration for the movement at this time was Japan (particularly
after its 1905 military victory over Russia), a country that was seen to
have succeeded economically while retaining its cultural values
(Sartori 2008: 166; Goswami 2004: 54). Local media were initially
optimistic that the movement would continue until the people ‘have
fully developed their own industries and are able to enter the world
market on equal terms with other nations’ (quoted in Sartori 2008:
162). But it lost momentum within a few years.
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It was revived after World War One by Mohandas Karamchand
Gandhi, who put particular emphasis on the support of hand spinning
and weaving as well as a broader vision of a decentralised national
economy centred on self-governing and relatively self-reliant
villages. Gandhi argued that this decentralised economic order
would be more democratic and more supportive of spiritual values,
as well as less prone to encouraging the kinds of concentrated wealth
and power that emerged in large-scale industrial societies (Ghosh
2007). He wanted to ‘prevent our villages from catching the infection
of industrialism’, and argued that ‘the Scriptures of the world are far
safer and truer treatises on the laws of economics than many of the
modern text-books’ (quoted in Gopalakrishnan 1959: 190, 188).
Gandhi’s style of economic nationalism was a far cry from that of
List and of the Meiji leaders, as well as that of many members of the
Congress Party, including Jawaharlal Nehru, who favoured rapid
state-led industrialisation. Interestingly, however, it inspired later
‘green’ thinkers who emerged in IPE debates as advocates of local
self-reliance, and critics of large-scale industrial development (e.g.
Helleiner 1996).
There is one further way in which the ideas of economic nationalists
such as List were modified and transformed in other contexts. List
himself had been very clear that his arguments were meant to apply
only to countries in the ‘temperate’ zones of the earth, and that
industrialisation should not be pursued by countries in the ‘tropical’
or ‘torrid’ regions (including all of South America). Those regions
were, in his view, destined to be commodity exporters partly because
of their climate. But his views were also shaped by Eurocentric
assumptions about the inferior state of the culture and civilisation of
peoples in many of these regions (Boianovsky 2012: 658-62). For
example, he argued that ‘a regeneration of Asia’ was ‘only possible
by means of an influence of European vital power, by the general
introduction of the Christian religion and of European moral laws
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and order, by European immigration, and the introduction of
European styles of government’ (quoted in Özveren 2002: 141)
Boianovsky (2012: 677) notes that this aspect of List’s thought was
generally ignored by economic nationalists beyond Europe and the
United States. But some, such as Ranade, directly challenged
whether there was any justification for separating the world into
‘temperate’ and ‘torrid’ zones, and assuming that countries in the
latter should never industrialise. He noted that ‘the natural fitness of
things requires that the manufacturers should spring up where the
raw materials grow, and where besides there is demand for the
manufactured produce, rather than that bulky goods should be
transported many thousands of miles over land and sea, and
reconsigned the same way back’. He also called attention to the fact
that ‘the differences in favour of temperate regions are all modern
growths due to the employment of steam machinery and the
abundance of cheap iron and coal’. Finally, he reminded his readers
that ‘the torrid zone people may fairly appeal to past history, when
their skilled products found a ready market in temperate kingdoms,
and excited such jealousy as to dictate prohibitive sumptuary laws
both in ancient Rome and modern England’ (quoted in
Gopalakrishnan 1959: 121).
Classical Marxist theories
of imperialism
Marxism is the third dominant intellectual tradition usually cited in
histories of the classical foundations of IPE thought. Marx himself
did not develop a systematic theory of international economic
dynamics, but his followers began to do this in the late 19th and early
20th century in an effort to explain the scramble for colonies by the
dominant powers at that time. Developed by thinkers such as Rosa
Luxemburg, Rudolf Hilferding and Vladimir Lenin, Marxist
theories of imperialism suggested that the acquisition of colonies had
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been driven by the dynamics of capitalism: in the face of declining
profits, capitalist societies had turned to imperialism to find new
markets, new resources and labour to exploit, and new investment
locations for surplus capital. But most Marxists saw imperialism as
only as a temporary fix for capitalism’s problems, given the
geographical limits of imperial expansion, the risk of increasingly
violent conflict among imperial powers as these limits were reached,
and the growing likelihood of social revolution within the imperial
powers as economic conditions worsened, and unpopular wars broke
out. As Lenin (1916 [1970]: 14) put it, imperialism was thus the
‘highest stage of capitalism’, as it marked ‘the eve of the social
revolution of the proletariat’.
Although initially developed by European thinkers, Marxism and
Marxist theories of imperialism were globally influential. Histories
of IPE thought generally focus on the link between these theories and
the rise of dependency theory in Southern countries in the 1960s and
1970s, a development that helped to give rise to the modern post-war
field of IPE itself. Dependency theorists reformulated Marxist
theories of imperialism from the standpoint of the ‘periphery’ rather
than the ‘core’. But Marxist theory affected IPE thought beyond
Europe well before the emergence of dependency theory, in ways
that deserve more attention.
This influence often did not emerge until after the 1917 Russian
revolution. It is important to recognise, as Ilham Khuri-Makdisi
(2010) shows so well, how radical ideas relating to political economy
were already circulating globally in the late 19th and early 20th
centuries through networks fostered by newspapers, periodicals,
postal communication, the telegraph, the ease of transportation,
migrant communities, and nodal world cities. But her research shows
how this emerging ‘global radical culture’ tended to be associated
more with ideas such as social democracy, socialism, Fabianism,
anarchism, and anti-colonialism than with Marxism. It was not until
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the Russian revolution that the political salience of Marxist thought
suddenly grew in many parts of the world.
This pattern was certainly apparent in Japan, the one non-western
country that had emerged as a major new colonial power in the age of
imperialism. Marxism did not have strong roots in Japan at the time
when that country acquired its first colonies of Taiwan (1895) and
Korea (1910). Indeed, the first Japanese translation of Marx’s Da
kapital did not appear until 1920, and Lenin was relatively unknown
in Japan at the time of the 1917 Russian revolution, even among the
Japanese socialist movement that had been gaining domestic support
(Hoston 1986: 24). During the 1920s, however, Marxist thought
rapidly gained influence, and by 1927 it had even ‘begun to rival the
influence of classical western – primarily British – schools of
economics in Japan’s leading Tokyo Imperial and Kyoto Imperial
universities, the training grounds for Japan’s bureaucrats and
nongovernmental political leaders’ (Hoston 1986: 27-8).
In 1927, a major debate broke out in Japanese Marxist circles about
the relevance of Lenin’s theory of imperialism to the Japanese case
(Hoston 1986: ch 4). The debate was provoked by the Marxist
journalist and peasant activist Takahashi Kamekichi, who argued
that Japan was engaged in a distinct kind of ‘petty bourgeois
imperialism’ that was not well captured by Lenin’s theory. As a late
developer with limited resources, Takahashi argued, Japan had
engaged in a defensive form of imperialism designed to protect its
economic growth and status as an independent state in a world that
was increasingly carved up into competing spheres of economic
influence. He concluded that Japanese imperialism deserved the
support, rather than the criticism, of the left, since it fostered the
growth of Japan’s proletariat and a socialist revolution. He also
suggested that Japanese imperialism could ‘liberate’ Asia from
western powers, arguing that ‘just as the interests of the petite
bourgeoisie coincide with those of the proletariat and are not one
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with the interests of the grande bourgeoisie, the interests of petty
imperialist countries coincide more with those of countries subject to
imperialism than with those of large imperialist countries’ (quoted in
Hoston 1986: 81).
Takahashi’s support for Japan’s military expansion was
controversial on the left (and even more so when he became a
consultant to Japanese colonial administrations in the 1930s, and was
associated with right-wing nationalist groups after Japan’s invasion
of China in 1937). Although many elsewhere in Asia had been
inspired by Japan’s 1905 defeat of Russia, Japanese socialists had
opposed the war at the time (Hoston 1986: 21, 74). Takahashi’s
thesis also appeared around the same time that the Communist
International (Comintern) expressed its view that Japanese
capitalism still had many feudal characteristics and thus required a
‘bourgeois-democratic revolution’ before proceeding to a
proletarian revolution. That thesis – endorsed by the Japanese
Communist Party (which had been founded in 1922) – paved the way
for the Comintern’s view after Japan’s invasion of Manchuria that
Japanese imperialism was best explained by enduring feudal
elements in Japanese society (Hoston 1986: 72).5 Takahashi’s
explanation of Japanese imperialism was also rejected by those
Japanese Marxists who felt the Comintern had underestimated the
advanced nature of Japanese capitalism, and who cited their
country’s imperialism as further evidence to support this view.
European Marxist theories of imperialism were reinterpreted not just
by Japanese Marxists but also by Marxists from colonised regions
during the 1920s. One of the most important was India’s
Manabendra Nath Roy. The son of a poor village schoolteacher, Roy
had become involved as a teenager and young man in swadeshi
politics in the early 20th century (Goswami 2004: 249; Chowduri
2007: 45-6). After leaving India in 1915, he converted to Marxism
and ended up in Mexico, where he helped found the Mexican
Communist Party in 1919 and (from his exile) the Communist Party
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of India in 1920. Representing Mexico at the 1920 Second World
Congress of the Comintern in Moscow, Roy advanced important
views about the role of imperialism in colonialised regions, and the
political agency of colonised peoples.
Roy argued that imperialist policies over ‘Eastern peoples’ had
prevented them ‘from developing, socially and economically, side
by side with their fellows in Europe and America’. As he put it,
‘skilled craft industries were destroyed to make room for the
products of the centralised industries in the imperialist countries;
consequently, a majority of the population was driven to the land to
produce food grains and raw materials for export to foreign lands’
(quoted in d’Encausse and Schram 1969: 161). These arguments
echoed earlier Indian economic nationalist thinking, but marked an
important intervention in Marxist discussions which had often
assumed that imperialism was promoting – rather than restricting –
the growth of a capitalist economy in the colonies. Marx himself had
suggested that he saw colonialism in places such as India – including
Britain’s destruction of the local textile industry – as a brutal but
progressive force that spread capitalism and thus paved the way for
socialist revolutions (e.g. Marx 1853 [2013]). From the perspective
of Roy, however, colonialism in India had created a severely
distorted economy that undermined development. In this respect, his
views anticipated the analysis of later dependency thinkers about the
link between imperialism and underdevelopment.
Roy also outlined a distinctive position about the agency of the
colonised in revolutionary politics. Their political role assumed a
much more prominent place on the agenda of the 1920 Comintern
meeting than it had at the first Comintern Congress in 1919, where
attention had been devoted to encouraging revolution in Europe. As
prospects for the latter dimmed, Lenin turned to anti-colonial
revolutions as a mechanism to weaken western capitalism and
generate economic distress that might encourage a European
proletarian uprising. He invited many more delegates from beyond
Globalising the classical foundations of IPE
thought
997
Contexto Internacional (PUC)
Vol. 37 no 3 – set/dez 2015
1ª Revisão: 11/10/2015
2ª Revisão: 22/10/2015
Europe to the meeting, and highlighted how the previous Second
International (1889-1916) had not been truly international because
of the absence of representatives from Asia and Africa (Chowduri
2007: 52). Indeed, the meetings of the Second International had
devoted very little attention to the political agency of colonised
peoples, or the impact of imperialism on those peoples. The
Eurocentrism of the Second International was particularly evident in
the early 20th century when some members backed colonialism
because of their support for the ‘civilising’ mission of imperial
ideology, and because of the benefits colonialism provided to
European workers (d’Encausse and Schram 1969: 15-16; see also
Tansel 2015 for the Eurocentrism of classical Marxist thought).
Lenin’s draft policy for the 1920 conference suggested that the
Comintern should support ‘bourgeois-democratic liberation’
movements in colonised regions that were challenging imperial rule.
Roy strongly endorsed the idea that the success of western
revolutionary movements now relied heavily on revolutionary
movements in the colonies. Indeed, he even argued that ‘the fate of
the revolutionary movement in Europe depends entirely on the
course of the revolution in the East’, a claim that Lenin felt went ‘too
far’ (quoted in d’Encausse and Schram 1969: 151-2). But Roy
opposed the idea that the Comintern should support
‘bourgeois-democratic liberation’ movements because he felt they
could not be trusted, particularly in economically advanced colonies
where the bourgeoisie was tempted to ally with imperialist interests.
In the Indian context and elsewhere, he wanted the Comintern to
support local communist parties instead, a stance influenced by his
long-standing opposition to the moderate stance of the Indian
National Congress as well as his wariness of Gandhi, whose efforts
to appeal to local religious and cultural values and preserve local
village life struck Roy as more reactionary than revolutionary
(Haithcox 1969, Chowduri 2007: 34, 53; d’Encausse and Schram
1969: 151, 162). Lenin agreed to adjust his text, and the Comintern
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backed a resolution to support ‘revolutionary-liberation movements
in backward countries or among backward nationalities’, although
Lenin made clear that this wording did not preclude collaboration
with bourgeois movements (quoted in d’Encausse and Schram 1969:
152). Roy had taken the lead in challenging Lenin from a
non-western perspective, but he had not been alone. The founder of
the Communist Party of Persia, Avetis Sultan-Zade, supported
Roy’s position at the meeting (White 1984). Tan Malaka from
Indonesia also subsequently challenged Lenin’s condemnation of
Pan-Islamism, arguing that the latter was a progressive and
anti-imperialist movement rather than a reactionary one (d’Encausse
and Schram 1969: 42).
The issues that concerned Roy about the impact of imperialism on
the colonised and the agency of non-European peoples also attracted
attention in Latin America during the interwar period. For example,
the Peruvian activist Raúl Haya de la Torre argued that imperialism
had been the first stage of capitalism in Latin America rather than its
final stage and that it had contributed to Latin American economic
backwardness, and supported feudal structures that blocked future
economic progress. After travelling to Russia in the mid-1920s, he
also became sceptical of communism and Russian efforts to lead
anti-imperialist struggles, efforts which he concluded would
primarily serve Russian interests, and showed little understanding of
Latin American conditions. Through his Alianza Popular
Revolucionaria Americana (APRA), he sought to build a pan-Latin
American anti-imperialist movement that was ‘neither with
Washington, nor with Moscow’, and drew inspiration from the
common heritage of indigenous peoples in the region (quoted in
Drinot 2012: 736).
Another Peruvian thinker who invoked this inspiration was one of
the best-known Latin American Marxists of this period, José Carlos
Mariátegui. After embracing Marxism during travels in Europe
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between 1919 and 1923, Mariátegui worked initially with Haya de la
Torre, but then rejected APRA’s willingness to work with bourgeois
interests, and founded the Partido Socialista Peruano in 1928. While
Latin American elites had traditionally looked down upon
indigenous peoples, Mariátegui hoped to build a revolutionary
movement in which indigenous peoples played a central role and
whose end goal was a socialist society underpinned by ‘indigenismo’
that protected and built upon their traditions and communitarian
values. As he put it, ‘we have inherited instinctively the idea of
socialism … from the Inca world’ (quoted in Subirats 2010: 518).
Subirats (2010: 519, 518) notes that Mariátegui’s project thus
radically opposed the Eurocentric conception of a singular
‘civilisation process’ by ‘defining the Andean socialist revolution as
a civilisation process historically rooted in the Incan “communist”
economic and social system that later experienced the colonial
destruction of the Andean communities, and then evolved towards a
modern independent republicanism, and finally would accomplish a
socialist order that would restore the Inca-based popular indigenous
traditions’.
The question of which kind of anti-imperialist movements outside
Europe should be supported by Marxists continued to generate
controversy in many regions of the world and within the Comintern,
particularly after communists were repressed – often brutally – by
nationalist leaders in places such as Turkey and China in the 1920s.
The Chinese case was especially problematic because the Comintern
had initially forced members of the Chinese Communist Party to join
the nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) in the early 1920s as part of
Soviet efforts to maintain good relations with the KMT leader Sun
Yat-sen (d’Encausse and Schram 1969: 53). Sun himself was
sceptical of Marxism, but it is worth noting his important
contribution to theories of imperialism since they have usually been
neglected by IPE histories of thought.
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At the end of World War One, Sun (1922 [1918]) published a
remarkable book entitled The international development of China
which called on western governments to create an international
organisation devoted to bolstering Chinese living standards through
the provision of foreign capital, technology and expertise to
state-owned enterprises. Sun argued that this proposed ‘International
Development Organisation’ would benefit not just the Chinese
people but also western capitalist powers. Besides providing an
outlet for the latter’s surplus capital and goods after the war, the
intergovernmental nature of this organisation would prevent
inter-imperialist war over China.
Sun’s ideas not only helped to pioneer modern concepts of
international development; they also, in theoretical terms, proposed
a way to operationalise a new stage of capitalism involving an
alliance – rather than war – among imperialists, a stage that Kautsky
(1914 [1970]) had also anticipated in 1914 and given the name
‘ultra-imperialism’. While rejected by western powers at the time,
Sun’s innovative proposal later served as one of the inspirations for
the establishment of the World Bank at the 1944 Bretton Woods
conference (Helleiner 2014: ch 7). From his non-Marxist
perspective, Sun can be credited with pioneering an early blueprint
for this institution that many Marxists came to see as a symbol of
‘ultra-imperialism’ in the post-1945 era.
Conclusion
Contemporary scholars interested in promoting a ‘global
conversation’ in the field of IPE need to reflect on how the history of
the classical foundations of their field is being told. At the moment,
these foundations are usually identified with the ideas of European
and American thinkers in the 18th, 19th and early 20th centuries. This
approach is problematic not just because those ideas often suffer
from Eurocentric biases, but also because it steers attention away
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from the perspectives of historical thinkers in other parts of the world
in this period. This article has suggested one way in which the
intellectual history of IPE’s classical foundations can begin to be
‘globalised’ by exploring how thinkers located outside Europe and
the United States engaged with and contributed to ideas associated
with the three well-known IPE traditions of economic liberalism,
economic nationalism and Marxism in the pre-1939 era.
This analysis also provides a reminder that ‘global conversations’
involving thinkers in many regions of the world were extensive in
this earlier era. In the 18th century, political economy tracts written
by authors from distant lands were being read and translated, even in
isolated contexts such as Tokugawa Japan. By the 19th and early 20th
century, the transnational flow of ideas became even more
widespread in the context of the broader globalisation of goods,
people, information and culture.
Many of the ‘global conversations’ described in this article involved
more of a one-way transmission of European and American ideas to
the rest of the world. Indeed, those ideas had a much wider global
reach than is often identified in histories of the classical foundations
of IPE thought. They were usually exported in the context of highly
unequal power relations, but, for various reasons, they often held
genuine appeal for thinkers in other regions. Economic liberalism
attracted those who were critical of colonial trade restrictions (e.g.
Bengal, Latin America) as well as elites who sought to justify their
role as exporters of resources to Europe and importers of European
manufactured products (e.g. Latin America, post-Ali Egypt).
Economic nationalism resonated with elites seeking to confront
growing European and American economic dominance. Marxist
theories of imperialism also offered an attractive analytical
framework for those involved in anti-colonial and revolutionary
movements.
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When European and American ideas were imported into other
regions, they were often modified and transformed in interesting
ways. Colombian liberal elites combined their support for free trade
at the border with endorsements of coercive labour practices within
their country. By contrast, liberals in Meiji Japan embraced domestic
liberalisation more enthusiastically than free trade. Pellegrini linked
his economic nationalism in Argentina to the project of joining the
gold standard. In colonial India, European and American economic
nationalist ideas were modified in other ways, including through the
consumption-based swadeshi movement, the focus on colonialism’s
economic impact, the critique of List’s analysis of ‘torrid zone’
countries, and Gandhi’s decentralist vision. In the Marxist camp,
new categories of imperialism were proposed in Japan, while the
impact of imperialism on the colonised and their role in
revolutionary politics was reconceptualised by Marxists from India,
Persia, Indonesia and Latin America.
The contributions of thinkers outside Europe and the United States
went well beyond simply modifying ideas from elsewhere. This
article has highlighted how economic nationalists in Meiji Japan
drew more heavily on local kokueki thought than the ideas of foreign
economic nationalists such as List. Similarly, the ‘mercantilist’
thinking of leaders such as Muhammad Ali in Egypt and Mensa
Bonsu in West Africa appeared to emerge in large part from
distinctive local experiences and contexts. Mariátegui also drew on
pre-colonial indigenous traditions and values in formulating a new
kind of socialist project for Peru that rejected Eurocentric linear
conceptions of civilisational progress. The flow of ideas also
sometimes went in other directions. For example, Naoriji’s drain
theory attracted the attention of European theorists of imperialism,
and anticipated the ideas of later Latin American dependency
theorists. Sun’s pioneering proposals after World War One helped
shape subsequent European and American thinking about
international development institutions. Gandhi’s decentralist vision
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informed more recent ‘green’ advocates of localism in Europe, North
America, and elsewhere. These examples may provide important
precedents for the kind of ‘global conversation’ of reciprocal
learning that many IPE scholars are calling for today.
As noted at the start, this article does not pretend to provide a
comprehensive survey of the perspectives of thinkers in regions
outside Europe and the United States, and their contributions to the
classical foundations of the field we now call IPE. There are many
more examples of relevant historical figures who engaged with
classical economic liberalism, economic nationalism and Marxism
in interesting and innovative ways before 1939. A wider analysis that
focuses not just on these three traditional classical schools would
also help to reveal other kinds of perspectives and contributions of
thinkers in those regions. This article has tried, however, to take one
small step in the direction of globalising the classical foundations of
IPE. There is much more work to be done.
Notes
1. This article is part of a wider book-length study I am writing on this topic.
2. For discussions of ‘global intellectual history’, see Moyn and Sartori
(2013), Gänger and Lewis (2013).
3. The ideas promoted by List, Carey and Hamilton were the most politically
prominent version of western ‘economic nationalism’ in the 19th century, but
there were other versions as well; see Helleiner (2002).
4. According to Al-Sayyid Marsot (1984: 32-3, 97, 131-2, 263), Ali was not
driven by broader Egyptian nationalist sentiments. He had come to Egypt in
1801 from Ottoman Albania as a mercenary soldier within the Ottoman army
and he valued his Ottoman identity very highly while never identifying with
Egyptians,. As Al-Sayyid Marsot (1984: 131) puts it, ‘To him Egypt was a piece
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of property he had acquired by guile and ability. The Egyptians were there to do
his bidding’.
5. Interestingly, this interpretation echoed Joseph Schumpeter’s critique of
Marxist theories of imperialism.
References
Acharya, Amitav. 2011. ‘Dialogue and discovery: in search of international
relations theories beyond the west’. Millennium: Journal of International
Studies 39 (3): 619-37.
Al-Sayyid Marsot and Afaf Lutfi. 1984. Egypt in the reign of Muhammad Ali.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Almenar, Salvador. 2014. ‘The reception and dissemination of Ricardo’s ideas
in Spain’. In Gilbert Faccarello and Masashi Izumo (eds), The reception of
David Ricardo in continental Europe and Japan. London: Routledge.
Blaney, David and Naeem Inayatullah. 2010. Savage economics. London:
Routledge.
Blyth, Mark. 2009. ‘Introduction’. In Mark Blyth (ed), Routledge handbook of
IPE: IPE as a global conversation. New York: Routledge.
Boianovsky, Mauro. 2012. ‘Friedrich List and the economic fate of tropical
countries’. History of Political Economy 45 (4): 647-91.
Bryan, Steven. 2010. The gold standard at the turn of the twentieth century.
New York. Columbia University Press.
Cain, P. 1979. ‘Capitalism, war and internationalism in the thought of Richard
Cobden’. British Journal of International Studies 5 (3): 229-47.
Cardoso, José Luis. 2014. ‘The diffusion of Ricardo and classical political
economy in Portugal’. In Gilbert Faccarello and Masashi Izumo (eds), The
reception of David Ricardo in continental Europe and Japan. London:
Routledge.
Globalising the classical foundations of IPE
thought
1005
Contexto Internacional (PUC)
Vol. 37 no 3 – set/dez 2015
1ª Revisão: 11/10/2015
2ª Revisão: 22/10/2015
Chin, Gregory; Margaret Pearson and Wang Yong (eds). 2014. ‘IPE in China:
the global conversation’. Review of International Political Economy 20 (6):
1145-1299.
Chowduri, Satyabrata Rai. 2007. Leftism in India, 1917-1947. Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan.
Cohen, Benjamin. 2008. International political economy: an intellectual
history. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
. 2013. Advanced introduction to international political economy.
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Cox, Robert. 2011. ‘The “British School” in the global context’. In Nicola
Phillips and Catherine Weaver (eds), International political economy. London:
Routledge.
Drinot, Paulo. 2012. ‘Creole anti-communism: labor, the Peruvian Communist
Party, and APAR, 1930-1934’. Hispanic American Historical Review 92 (4):
703-36.
Earle, Edward. 1966. ‘Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton, Frederick List: the
economic foundations of military power’. In E Earle (ed), The makers of
modern strategy. New York: Atheneum.
D’Encausse, Hélène Carrrère and Stuart R Schram. 1969. Marxism and Asia.
London: Penguin.
Gänger, Stephanie and Su Lin Lewis. 2013. ‘Forum: A world of ideas: new
pathways in global intellectual history, c.1880-1930’. Modern Intellectual
History 10 (2): 347-51.
Ghosh, B N. 2007. Gandhian political economy. Aldershott: Ashgate.
Gopalakrishnan, P K. 1959. Development of economic ideas in India. New
Delhi: People’s Publishing House.
Goswami, Manu. 2004. Producing India: from colonial economy to national
space. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Haithcox, John. 1969. ‘Left wing unity and the Indian Nationalist Movement:
M N Roy and the Congress Socialist Party’.ModernAsianStudies3 (1): 17-56.
Helleiner, Eric. 1996. ‘International political economy and the Greens’. New
Political Economy 1 (1): 59-78.
Eric Helleiner
1006 CONTEXTO INTERNACIONAL – vol. 37, no 3, september/december 2015
Contexto Internacional (PUC)
Vol. 37 no 3 – set/dez 2015
1ª Revisão: 11/10/2015
2ª Revisão: 22/10/2015
. 2002. ‘Economic nationalism as a challenge to economic liberalism?’.
International Studies Quarterly 46 (3): 307-29.
. 2009. ‘Division and dialogue in Anglo-American IPE: a reluctant
Canadian view’. New Political Economy 14 (3): 377-83.
. 2014. Forgotten foundations of Bretton Woods: international
development and the making of the postwar order. Ithaca: Cornell University
Press.
Hobson, John M. 2013a. ‘Part 1 – Revealing the Eurocentric foundations of
IPE: a critical historiography of the discipline from the classical to the modern
era’. Review of International Political Economy 20 (5): 1024–54.
Hobson, John M. 2013b. ‘Part 2 – Reconstructing the non-Eurocentric
foundations of IPE: from Eurocentric “open economy politics” to
inter-civilizational political economy’. Review of International Political
Economy 20 (5): 1055–1081.
Horton, James Africanus. 1969 [1868]. West African countries and peoples.
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Hoston, Germaine. 1986. Marxism and the crisis of development in prewar
Japan. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Kautsky, Karl. 1914 [1970]. ‘Ultra-imperialism’. New Left Review 59: 41-6.
Khuri-Makdisi, Ilham. 2010. The Eastern Mediterranean and the making of
global radicalism, 1860-1914. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Leander, Anna. 2009. ‘Why we need multiple stories about the global political
economy’. Review of International Political Economy 16 (2): 321–28.
Lenin, Vladimir. 1916 [1970]. Imperialism: the highest stage of capitalism.
Moscow: Progress.
List, Friedrich. 1904 [1841]. The national system of political economy.
Translated by Sampson Lloyd. London: Longmans, Green and Co.
Love, Joseph. 1996. Crafting the third world. Stanford: Stanford University
Press.
Marx, Karl. 2013 [1853]. ‘The British Rule in India’. In Darel Paul and Abla
Amawi (eds), The theoretical evolution of international political economy.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Globalising the classical foundations of IPE
thought
1007
Contexto Internacional (PUC)
Vol. 37 no 3 – set/dez 2015
1ª Revisão: 11/10/2015
2ª Revisão: 22/10/2015
Metzler, Mark. 2006. ‘The cosmopolitanism of national economics: Friedrich
List in a Japanese mirror’. In A G Hopkins (ed), Global history. Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan.
Mizuta, Hiroshi. 1988. ‘Historical introduction’. In Chûhei Sugiyama and
Hiroshi Mizuta (eds), Enlightenment and beyond: political economy comes to
Japan. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press.
Morley, John. 1906. The life of Richard Cobden. London: T Fisher Unwin.
Morris-Suzuki, Tessa. 1989.A history of Japanese economic thought. London:
Routledge.
Morrison, James. 2012. ‘Before hegemony: Adam Smith, American
independence, and the origins of the first era of globalisation’. International
Organization 66: 395-28.
Moyn, Samuel and Andrew Sartori (eds). 2013. Global intellectual history.
New York: Columbia University Press.
Murphy, Craig N. 2009. ‘Do the left-out matter?’. New Political Economy 14
(3): 357–65.
Özveren, Eyüp. 2002. ‘Ottoman economic thought and economic policy in
transition’. In Michalis Psalidopoulos and Marina Mata (eds), Economic
thought and policy in less developed Europe. London: Routledge.
Özveren, Eyüp. 2015. ‘Turkey and the Turkic linguistic zone’. In Vincent
Barnett (ed), Routledge handbook of the history of global economic thought.
London: Routledge.
Phillips, Andrew. 2012. ‘Saving civilization from Empire: belligerency,
pacificism and the two faces of civilization during the second opium war’.
European Journal of International Relations 18 (1): 5-27.
Phillips, Nicola. 2009. ‘The slow death of pluralism’. Review of International
Political Economy 16 (1): 85-94.
Phillips, Nicola (ed). 2005. Globalizing international political economy.
Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
Phillips, Nicola and Catherine Waever (eds). 2011. International political
economy: debating the past, present and future. London: Routledge.
Reinert, Sophus. 2011. Translating Empire: emulation and the origins of
political economy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Eric Helleiner
1008 CONTEXTO INTERNACIONAL – vol. 37, no 3, september/december 2015
Contexto Internacional (PUC)
Vol. 37 no 3 – set/dez 2015
1ª Revisão: 11/10/2015
2ª Revisão: 22/10/2015
Ricardo, David. 1817 [1948]. On the principles of political economy and
taxation. London: Dent.
Roberts, Luke. 1998.Mercantilism in a Japanese domain: themerchant origins
of economic nationalism in 18th-century Tosa. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Rojas, Cristina. 2002. Civilization and violence: regimes of representation in
nineteenth-century Colombia. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Sagers, John. 2006. Origins of Japanese wealth and power: reconciling
Confucianism and capitalism, 1830-1885. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
Sartori, Andrew. 2008. Bengal in global concept history. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press.
Seth, Sanjay. 2011. ‘Postcolonial theory and the critique of international
relations’. Millennium 40 (1): 167-83.
Shilliam, Robbie (ed). 2010. International relations and non-western thought:
imperialism, colonialism and investigations of global modernity. London:
Routledge.
Smith, Adam. 1976 [1776]. An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth
of nations. New York: Oxford University Press.
Subirats, Eduardo. 2010. ‘Mariátegui, Latin American socialism, and Asia’.
World Review of Political Economy 1 (3): 517-30.
Sugiyama, Chûhei. 1988. ‘Fukuzama Yukichi’. In Chûhei Sugiyama and
Hiroshi Mizuta (eds), Enlightenment and beyond: political economy comes to
Japan. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press.
Sun Yat-sen. 1922 [1918].The international development of China. New York:
G P Putnam & Sons.
Tansel, Cemal Burak. 2015. ‘Deafening silence? Marxism, international
historical sociology and the spectre of Eurocentrism’. European Journal of
International Relations 21 (1): 76-100.
Vasilaki, Rosa. 2012. ‘Provincialising IR? Deadlocks and prospects in
post-Western IR theory’. Millennium 41 (1): 3-22.
White, Stephen. 1984. ‘Soviet Russia and the Asian revolution, 1917-1924’.
Review of International Studies 10 (3): 219-32
Wilks, Ivor. 1975. Asante in the nineteenth century. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Globalising the classical foundations of IPE
thought
1009
Contexto Internacional (PUC)
Vol. 37 no 3 – set/dez 2015
1ª Revisão: 11/10/2015
2ª Revisão: 22/10/2015
Abstract
Globalising the classical
foundations of IPE thought
Current efforts to teach and research the historical foundations of IPE
thought in classical political economy in the 18th, 19th and early 20th
centuries centre largely on European and American thinkers. If a more
extensive ‘global conversation’ is to be fostered in the field today, the
perspectives of thinkers in other regions need to be recognised, and brought
into the mainstream of its intellectual history. As a first step towards
‘globalising’ the classical foundations of IPE thought, this article
demonstrates some ways in which thinkers located beyond Europe and the
United States engaged with and contributed to debates associated with the
three well-known classical traditions on which current IPE scholarship
often draws: economic liberalism, economic nationalism and Marxism. It
also reveals the extensive nature of ‘global conversations’ about IPE issues
in this earlier era.
Keywords: International Political Economy – Intellectual History –
Globalisation – Economic Liberalism – Economic Nationalism – Marxist
Theories of Imperialism
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